26 citations · 102 across the 23 of their papers we have counts for
20 papers · 1 filter
Algorithmic Information Design for Searchers with Uncertain Alternatives
Zhicheng Du, Hu Fu, Ying Qin +1
Advertisements reveal information to consumers who decide on further information acquisition and eventual purchase. Anderson and Renault (2006) first modeled this problem using an…
Stability of Decentralized Queueing Networks Beyond Complete Bipartite Cases
Hu Fu, Qun Hu, Jia'nan Lin
Gaitonde and Tardos recently studied a model of queueing networks where queues compete for servers and re-send returned packets in future rounds. They quantify the amount of additi…
Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions
Hu Fu, Tao Lin
In non-truthful auctions, agents' utility for a strategy depends on the strategies of the opponents and also the prior distribution over their private types; the set of Bayes Nash…
Limitations of Incentive Compatibility on Discrete Type Spaces
Taylor Lundy, Hu Fu
In the design of incentive compatible mechanisms, a common approach is to enforce incentive compatibility as constraints in programs that optimize over feasible mechanisms. Such co…
Report-Sensitive Spot-Checking in Peer-Grading Systems
Hedayat Zarkoob, Hu Fu, Kevin Leyton-Brown
Peer grading systems make large courses more scalable, provide students with faster and more detailed feedback, and help students to learn by thinking critically about the work of…
The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue
Hu Fu, Christopher Liaw, Sikander Randhawa
Bulow and Klemperer's well-known result states that, in a single-item auction where the bidders' values are independently and identically drawn from a regular distribution, the…
Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets
John Pang, Weixuan Lin, Hu Fu +3
In this paper, we analyze the worst case efficiency loss of online platform designs under a networked Cournot competition model. Inspired by some of the largest platforms in operat…
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms
Yang Cai, Federico Echenique, Hu Fu +3
Motivated by the growing prominence of third-party data providers in online marketplaces, this paper studies the impact of the presence of third-party data providers on mechanism d…
The Value of Information Concealment
Hu Fu, Chris Liaw, Pinyan Lu +1
We consider a revenue optimizing seller selling a single item to a buyer, on whose private value the seller has a noisy signal. We show that, when the signal is kept private, arbit…
Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
Hu Fu, Nicole Immolica, Brendan Lucier +1
Designing revenue optimal auctions for selling an item to symmetric bidders is a fundamental problem in mechanism design. Myerson (1981) shows that the second price auction wit…
Approximate Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings
Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu, Anna Karlin
We study revenue maximization in settings where agents' values are interdependent: each agent receives a signal drawn from a correlated distribution and agents' values are function…
Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling
Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline +1
Crémer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the distribution can extract the full soci…
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game…
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan +1
We study the design of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms in single parameter domains, for the objective of optimizing social efficiency as measured by social cost. In the pr…
Prior-independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents
Hu Fu, Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy
We study simple and approximately optimal auctions for agents with a particular form of risk-averse preferences. We show that, for symmetric agents, the optimal revenue (given a pr…
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +1
The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with linear utility and s…
Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +2
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional pref…
Truthfulness via Proxies
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
This short note exhibits a truthful-in-expectation -approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that uses polynomia…
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there…
Amplified Hardness of Approximation for VCG-Based Mechanisms
Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
If a two-player social welfare maximization problem does not admit a PTAS, we prove that any maximal-in-range truthful mechanism that runs in polynomial time cannot achieve an appr…