activity
20122026
most citedSimultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient

2 citations · 2 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

cs.LG2026

Emotional Preferences as Goal-Priority Regulation

Shiqi Liu, Yihua Tan, Hu Fu +1

A core question in decision-making for agents is whether the relative priorities of competing lower-level objectives can be determined by emotional preferences autonomously generat…

cs.GT2025

Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions

Hu Fu, Tao Lin

In non-truthful auctions such as first-price and all-pay auctions, the independent strategic behaviors of bidders, with the corresponding Bayes-Nash equilibrium notion, are notorio…

cs.GT2025

Price Stability and Improved Buyer Utility with Presentation Design: A Theoretical Study of the Amazon Buy Box

Ophir Friedler, Hu Fu, Anna Karlin +1

Platforms design the form of presentation by which sellers are shown to the buyers. This design not only shapes the buyers' experience but also leads to different market equilibria…

cs.GT2023

Pay to (Not) Play: Monetizing Impatience in Mobile Games

Taylor Lundy, Narun Raman, Hu Fu +1

Mobile gaming is a rapidly growing and incredibly profitable sector; having grown seven-fold over the past 10 years, it now grosses over $100 billion annually. This growth was due…

cs.GT2023

On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails

Yi Feng, Hu Fu, Qun Hu +4

Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical met…

cs.GT2012★ 2 cited

Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient

Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin +1

Simultaneous item auctions are simple procedures for allocating items to bidders with potentially complex preferences over different item sets. In a simultaneous auction, every bid…