112 citations · 529 across the 27 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint
Felix Brandt, Florian Grundbacher
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 for which the Banks set…
A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) stric…
Coordinating Charitable Donations with Leontief Preferences
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi +1
We consider the problem of funding public goods that are complementary in nature. Examples include charities handling different needs (e.g., protecting animals vs. providing health…
Towards a Characterization of Random Serial Dictatorship
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, René Romen
Random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a randomized assignment rule that - given a set of agents with strict preferences over houses - satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex…
On Locally Rationalizable Social Choice Functions
Felix Brandt, Chris Dong
We consider a notion of rationalizability, where the rationalizing relation may depend on the set of feasible alternatives. More precisely, we say that a choice function is locally…
Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, René Romen
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characteriz…
Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer
Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain)…
A Natural Adaptive Process for Collective Decision-Making
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
Consider an urn filled with balls, each labeled with one of several possible collective decisions. Now, let a random voter draw two balls from the urn and pick her more preferred a…
On the Structure of Stable Tournament Solutions
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Hans Georg Seedig +1
A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We prov…