112 citations · 529 across the 27 of their papers we have counts for
36 papers
The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint
Felix Brandt, Florian Grundbacher
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 for which the Banks set…
A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) stric…
Coordinating Charitable Donations with Leontief Preferences
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi +1
We consider the problem of funding public goods that are complementary in nature. Examples include charities handling different needs (e.g., protecting animals vs. providing health…
Towards a Characterization of Random Serial Dictatorship
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, René Romen
Random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a randomized assignment rule that - given a set of agents with strict preferences over houses - satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex…
Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains
Felix Brand, Patrick Lederer, Sascha Tausch
One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom…
Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures
Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Anaëlle Wilczynski
The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this…
Rigorous analysis of the interaction problem of sea ice with a rigid body
Tim Binz, Felix Brandt, Matthias Hieber
Consider the set of equations modeling the motion of a rigid body enclosed in sea ice. Using Hibler's viscous-plastic model for describing sea ice, it is shown by a certain decoupl…
Interaction of geophysical flows with sea ice dynamics
Tim Binz, Felix Brandt, Matthias Hieber
This article establishes local strong well-posedness and global strong well-posedness close to constant equilibria of a model coupling the primitive equations of ocean and atmosphe…
Time periodic solutions to Hibler's sea ice model
Felix Brandt, Matthias Hieber
It is shown that the viscous-plastic Hibler sea ice model admits a unique, strong -time periodic solution provided the given -periodic forcing functions are small in suitable…
Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, Warut Suksompong
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study th…
On Locally Rationalizable Social Choice Functions
Felix Brandt, Chris Dong
We consider a notion of rationalizability, where the rationalizing relation may depend on the set of feasible alternatives. More precisely, we say that a choice function is locally…
Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, René Romen
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characteriz…
Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer
Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain)…
A Natural Adaptive Process for Collective Decision-Making
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
Consider an urn filled with balls, each labeled with one of several possible collective decisions. Now, let a random voter draw two balls from the urn and pick her more preferred a…
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Patrick Lederer
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has s…
Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger +3
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model…
On the Structure of Stable Tournament Solutions
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Hans Georg Seedig +1
A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We prov…
Fractional Hedonic Games
Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt +3
The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribe…
k-Majority Digraphs and the Hardness of Voting with a Constant Number of Voters
Georg Bachmeier, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist +4
Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph may be induced as the pairwise majority relation of some preference profile. How…
Arrovian Aggregation of Convex Preferences
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
We consider social welfare functions that satisfy Arrow's classic axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto optimality when the outcome space is the convex hull…
Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Manuel Eberl +1
Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be man…
Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving
Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Dominik Peters
Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. Perhaps one of the most important desirable properties in this context is Condo…
The Impossibility of Extending Random Dictatorship to Weak Preferences
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Warut Suksompong
Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual preferences are strict. We show that n…
Welfare Maximization Entices Participation
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer
We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of cla…