Towards a Characterization of Random Serial Dictatorship

Abstract

Random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a randomized assignment rule that - given a set of $n$ agents with strict preferences over $n$ houses - satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. For $n\le 3$, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) have shown that RSD is characterized by these axioms. Extending this characterization to arbitrary $n$ is a long-standing open problem. By weakening ex post efficiency and strategyproofness, we reduce the question of whether RSD is characterized by these axioms for fixed $n$ to determining whether a matrix has rank $n^{2}n{!}^n$. We provide computer-generated counterexamples to show that two other approaches for proving the characterization (using deterministic extreme points or restricted domains of preferences) are inadequate.