2 citations · 4 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Discrete Screening
Alejandro Francetich, Burkhard C. Schipper
We consider a principal who wishes to screen an agent with \emph{discrete} types by offering a menu of \emph{discrete} quantities and \emph{discrete} transfers. We assume that the…
Rationalizable Screening and Disclosure under Unawareness
Alejandro Francetich, Burkhard C. Schipper
We analyze a principal-agent procurement problem in which the principal (she) is unaware some of the marginal cost types of the agent (he). Communication arises naturally as some t…
Matching, Unanticipated Experiences, Divorce, Flirting, Rematching, Etc
Burkhard C. Schipper, Tina Danting Zhang
We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their prefere…
Efficient Mechanisms under Unawareness
Kym Pram, Burkhard C. Schipper
We study the design of efficient mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. Assuming q…
Kuhn's Theorem for Games of the Extensive Form with Unawareness
Ki Vin Foo, Burkhard C. Schipper
We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. We prove that if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed str…
Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions
Ying Xue Li, Burkhard C. Schipper
When bidders bid on complex objects, they might be unaware of characteristics affecting their valuations. We assume that each buyer's valuation is a sum of independent random varia…