activity
20132025
most citedWhen is tit-for-tat unbeatable?

2 citations · 4 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing cs.GTShow all

9 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2025

Mechanism Design under Unawareness -- Extended Abstract

Kym Pram, Burkhard C. Schipper

We study the design of mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. While the mechanism designer cannot necessarily commit to a particular social choice function in the f…

cs.GT2023

Level-k Thinking in the Extensive Form

Burkhard C. Schipper, Hang Zhou

Level-k thinking has been widely applied as a solution concept for games in normal form in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider level-k thinking in games in extensi…

cs.GT2023

Conditional dominance in games with unawareness

Burkhard C. Schipper

Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013) introduced dynamic game with unawareness consisting of a partially ordered set of games in extensive form. Here, we study the normal form of dyn…

cs.GT2021

Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness

Burkhard Schipper

Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play…

cs.GT2019

Common Belief in Choquet Rationality and Ambiguity Attitudes -- Extended Abstract

Adam Dominiak, Burkhard Schipper

We consider finite games in strategic form with Choquet expected utility. Using the notion of (unambiguously) believed, we define Choquet rationalizability and characterize it by C…

cs.GT20172 cited

Self-confirming Games: Unawareness, Discovery, and Equilibrium

Burkhard C. Schipper

Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play…