2 citations · 4 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Common Belief in Choquet Rationality and Ambiguity Attitudes -- Extended Abstract
Adam Dominiak, Burkhard Schipper
We consider finite games in strategic form with Choquet expected utility. Using the notion of (unambiguously) believed, we define Choquet rationalizability and characterize it by C…
Self-confirming Games: Unawareness, Discovery, and Equilibrium
Burkhard C. Schipper
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play…
Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games
Burkhard C. Schipper
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come…
Preference-Based Unawareness
Burkhard C. Schipper
Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge and belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unaware…
When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
Peter Duersch, Joerg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class…