activity
20102025
most citedUnbeatable Imitation

64 citations · 124 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

21 papers

cs.GT2025

Mechanism Design under Unawareness -- Extended Abstract

Kym Pram, Burkhard C. Schipper

We study the design of mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. While the mechanism designer cannot necessarily commit to a particular social choice function in the f…

econ.TH2025

Screening with Discrete Types and Discrete Contracts

Alejandro Francetich, Burkhard C. Schipper

We study screening when both the agent's types and the contracts available to the principal are finite: Quantities and transfers are drawn from a finite integer grid, while margina…

econ.TH2025

Rationalizable Screening and Disclosure under Unawareness

Alejandro Francetich, Burkhard C. Schipper

We analyze a principal-agent procurement problem in which the principal (she) is unaware some of the marginal cost types of the agent (he). Communication arises naturally as some t…

econ.TH2025

Matching, Unanticipated Experiences, Divorce, Flirting, Rematching, Etc

Burkhard C. Schipper, Tina Danting Zhang

We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their prefere…

econ.TH2025

Efficient Mechanisms under Unawareness

Kym Pram, Burkhard C. Schipper

We study the design of efficient mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. Assuming q…

econ.TH2025

Kuhn's Theorem for Games of the Extensive Form with Unawareness

Ki Vin Foo, Burkhard C. Schipper

We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. We prove that if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed str…