19 citations · 81 across the 40 of their papers we have counts for
41 papers
Tradeoffs in Privacy, Welfare, and Fairness for Facility Location
Sara Fish, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Jason Z. Tang +1
The differentially private (DP) facility location problem seeks to determine a socially optimal placement for a public facility while ensuring that each participating agent's locat…
Pricing with Tips in Three-Sided Delivery Platforms
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes
We model a delivery platform facilitating transactions among three sides: buyers, stores, and couriers. In addition to buyers paying store-specific purchase prices and couriers rec…
EconEvals: Benchmarks and Litmus Tests for Economic Decision-Making by LLM Agents
Sara Fish, Julia Shephard, Minkai Li +2
We develop evaluation methods for measuring the economic decision-making capabilities and tendencies of LLMs. First, we develop benchmarks derived from key problems in economics --…
Quantifying Inefficiency
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ella Segev
We axiomatically define a cardinal social inefficiency function, which, given alternatives and individuals' vNM preferences, assigns a number -- the social inefficiency -- to each…
Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai +1
We conduct an incentivized lab experiment to test participants' ability to understand the DA matching mechanism and the strategyproofness property, conveyed in different ways. We f…
Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization
Luca D'Amico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma +1
We model the role of an online platform disrupting a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can transact with a subset of the buyers whom she already k…
Algorithmic Collusion by Large Language Models
Sara Fish, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ran I. Shorrer
We conduct experiments with algorithmic pricing agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs). In oligopoly settings, LLM-based pricing agents quickly and autonomously reach supraco…
Multi-District School Choice: Playing on Several Fields
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Michael Yin, Shirley Zhang
We extend the seminal model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008) to a setting with multiple school districts, each running its own separate centralized match, and focus on the case of two d…
Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem
Sara Fish, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Sergiu Hart
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenou…
Common Knowledge, Regained
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yoram Moses
For common knowledge to arise in dynamic settings, all players must simultaneously come to know it has arisen. Consequently, common knowledge cannot arise in many realistic setting…
The Distortion of Binomial Voting Defies Expectation
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gregory Kehne, Ariel D. Procaccia +2
In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outc…
Mechanism Design Without Disclosure: Committing to and Running Hidden Mechanisms
Ran Canetti, Amos Fiat, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
A central tenet in mechanism design is the ability to irrevocably commit to a mechanism. Commitment is achieved by public declaration, letting players verify incentive properties i…
Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Clayton Thomas
We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Tradi…
Strategyproofness-Exposing Descriptions of Matching Mechanisms
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Clayton Thomas
A menu description exposes strategyproofness by presenting a mechanism to player in two steps. Step (1) uses others' reports to describe 's menu of potential outcomes. Step…
Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li +1
We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside…
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +2
We consider a robust version of the revenue maximization problem, where a single seller wishes to sell items to a single unit-demand buyer. In this robust version, the seller k…
The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable Matching by Trial and Error
Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, David Kempe
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to…
To Infinity and Beyond: A General Framework for Scaling Economic Theories
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers, Ran I. Shorrer
Many economic theory models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. We provide a principled framework for scalin…
Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Lior Kovalio, Noam Nisan +1
We describe our experience with designing and running a matching market for the Israeli "Mechinot" gap-year programs. The main conceptual challenge in the design of this market was…
Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Kira Goldner, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem shows that…
Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared w…
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +1
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that for bilateral trade, there is no mechanism that is individually rational (IR), incentive compatible…
Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yishay Mansour +1
The literature on "mechanism design from samples," which has flourished in recent years at the interface of economics and computer science, offers a bridge between the classic comp…
Bounding the Menu-Size of Approximately Optimal Auctions via Optimal-Transport Duality
Yannai A. Gonczarowski
The question of the minimum menu-size for approximate (i.e., up-to-) Bayesian revenue maximization when selling two goods to an additive risk-neutral quasilinear buyer…