2 citations · 2 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +2
We consider a robust version of the revenue maximization problem, where a single seller wishes to sell items to a single unit-demand buyer. In this robust version, the seller k…
The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable Matching by Trial and Error
Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, David Kempe
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to…
Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Lior Kovalio, Noam Nisan +1
We describe our experience with designing and running a matching market for the Israeli "Mechinot" gap-year programs. The main conceptual challenge in the design of this market was…
Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Kira Goldner, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem shows that…
Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared w…
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +1
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that for bilateral trade, there is no mechanism that is individually rational (IR), incentive compatible…