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20112026
most citedStable Matching Mechanisms are Not Obviously Strategy-Proof

19 citations · 81 across the 40 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2024Show all

6 papers · 1 filter

econ.TH2024

Quantifying Inefficiency

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ella Segev

We axiomatically define a cardinal social inefficiency function, which, given alternatives and individuals' vNM preferences, assigns a number -- the social inefficiency -- to each…

econ.GN2024

Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai +1

We conduct an incentivized lab experiment to test participants' ability to understand the DA matching mechanism and the strategyproofness property, conveyed in different ways. We f…

cs.GT2024

Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization

Luca D'Amico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma +1

We model the role of an online platform disrupting a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can transact with a subset of the buyers whom she already k…

econ.GN2024★ 11 cited

Algorithmic Collusion by Large Language Models

Sara Fish, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ran I. Shorrer

We conduct experiments with algorithmic pricing agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs). In oligopoly settings, LLM-based pricing agents quickly and autonomously reach supraco…

cs.GT2024

Multi-District School Choice: Playing on Several Fields

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Michael Yin, Shirley Zhang

We extend the seminal model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008) to a setting with multiple school districts, each running its own separate centralized match, and focus on the case of two d…

cs.GT2024

Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem

Sara Fish, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Sergiu Hart

We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenou…