19 citations · 81 across the 40 of their papers we have counts for
25 papers · 1 filter
Pricing with Tips in Three-Sided Delivery Platforms
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes
We model a delivery platform facilitating transactions among three sides: buyers, stores, and couriers. In addition to buyers paying store-specific purchase prices and couriers rec…
Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization
Luca D'Amico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma +1
We model the role of an online platform disrupting a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can transact with a subset of the buyers whom she already k…
Multi-District School Choice: Playing on Several Fields
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Michael Yin, Shirley Zhang
We extend the seminal model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008) to a setting with multiple school districts, each running its own separate centralized match, and focus on the case of two d…
Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem
Sara Fish, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Sergiu Hart
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenou…
The Distortion of Binomial Voting Defies Expectation
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gregory Kehne, Ariel D. Procaccia +2
In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outc…
Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Clayton Thomas
We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Tradi…
Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li +1
We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside…
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +2
We consider a robust version of the revenue maximization problem, where a single seller wishes to sell items to a single unit-demand buyer. In this robust version, the seller k…
The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable Matching by Trial and Error
Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, David Kempe
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to…
To Infinity and Beyond: A General Framework for Scaling Economic Theories
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers, Ran I. Shorrer
Many economic theory models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. We provide a principled framework for scalin…
Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Lior Kovalio, Noam Nisan +1
We describe our experience with designing and running a matching market for the Israeli "Mechinot" gap-year programs. The main conceptual challenge in the design of this market was…
Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Kira Goldner, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem shows that…
Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared w…
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +1
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that for bilateral trade, there is no mechanism that is individually rational (IR), incentive compatible…
Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yishay Mansour +1
The literature on "mechanism design from samples," which has flourished in recent years at the interface of economics and computer science, offers a bridge between the classic comp…
Bounding the Menu-Size of Approximately Optimal Auctions via Optimal-Transport Duality
Yannai A. Gonczarowski
The question of the minimum menu-size for approximate (i.e., up-to-) Bayesian revenue maximization when selling two goods to an additive risk-neutral quasilinear buyer…
Efficient Empirical Revenue Maximization in Single-Parameter Auction Environments
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Noam Nisan
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that, given samples from the unknown valuation distribution of each bidder, learns an auction that approximately maximizes the auctioneer's r…
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness
Sophie Bade, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of preferences. Much…
The Menu-Size Complexity of Revenue Approximation
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Noam Nisan
Consider a monopolist selling items to an additive buyer whose item values are drawn from independent distributions possibly having unbounded support. Unli…
Stable Matching Mechanisms are Not Obviously Strategy-Proof
Itai Ashlagi, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well kno…
A Stable Marriage Requires Communication
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Noam Nisan, Rafail Ostrovsky +1
The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only steps in the average…
A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Moshe Tennenholtz
Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games (i…
A Mirage of Market Allocation
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Moshe Tennenholtz
Can noncooperative behaviour of merchants lead to a market split that prima facie seems anticompetitive? We introduce a model in which service providers, with ISPs being the main e…
Manipulation of Stable Matchings using Minimal Blacklists
Yannai A. Gonczarowski
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm (1962), the proposed-to side W (referred to as women there) can strategically force the W-optimal s…