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20112026
most citedAn Anytime Algorithm for Optimal Coalition Structure Generation

248 citations · 1.3k across the 45 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2014 · cs.GTShow all

5 papers · 2 filters

cs.GT2014

Towards a Fair Allocation of Rewards in Multi-Level Marketing

Talal Rahwan, Victor Naroditskiy, Tomasz Michalak +2

An increasing number of businesses and organisations rely on existing users for finding new users or spreading a message. One of the widely used "refer-a-friend" mechanisms offers…

cs.GT2014★ 129 cited

Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value for Game-Theoretic Network Centrality

Tomasz Pawel Michalak, Karthik V Aadithya, Piotr L. Szczepanski +2

The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. H…

cs.GT2014★ 82 cited

Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions

Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis +2

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalit…

cs.GT2014★ 28 cited

Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Task Allocation in the Presence of Execution Uncertainty

Sarvapali Dyanand Ramchurn, Claudio Mezzetti, Andrea Giovannucci +3

Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficien…

cs.GT2014★ 16 cited

Optimal Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes

Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep Kumar Dash, Andrew Byde +1

We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids lo…