248 citations · 1.3k across the 45 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Towards a Fair Allocation of Rewards in Multi-Level Marketing
Talal Rahwan, Victor Naroditskiy, Tomasz Michalak +2
An increasing number of businesses and organisations rely on existing users for finding new users or spreading a message. One of the widely used "refer-a-friend" mechanisms offers…
Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value for Game-Theoretic Network Centrality
Tomasz Pawel Michalak, Karthik V Aadithya, Piotr L. Szczepanski +2
The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. H…
Coalition Structure Generation over Graphs
Thomas Voice, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings
We give the analysis of the computational complexity of coalition structure generation over graphs. Given an undirected graph G = (N,E) and a valuation function v : P(N) \to R over…
Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis +2
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalit…
Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Task Allocation in the Presence of Execution Uncertainty
Sarvapali Dyanand Ramchurn, Claudio Mezzetti, Andrea Giovannucci +3
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficien…
An Anytime Algorithm for Optimal Coalition Structure Generation
Talal Rahwan, Sarvapali Dyanand Ramchurn, Nicholas Robert Jennings +1
Coalition formation is a fundamental type of interaction that involves the creation of coherent groupings of distinct, autonomous, agents in order to efficiently achieve their indi…