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20112026
most citedAn Anytime Algorithm for Optimal Coalition Structure Generation

248 citations · 1.3k across the 45 of their papers we have counts for

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13 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2021

Optimal Auction Design for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents

Farzaneh Farhadi, Maria Chli, Nicholas R. Jennings

We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict de…

cs.GT2019

Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance

Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Long Tran-Thanh +3

We model and study the problem of assigning traffic in an urban road network infrastructure. In our model, each driver submits their intended destination and is assigned a route to…

cs.GT2019

Selling Multiple Items via Social Networks

Dengji Zhao, Bin Li, Junping Xu +2

We consider a market where a seller sells multiple units of a commodity in a social network. Each node/buyer in the social network can only directly communicate with her neighbours…

cs.GT2015★ 7 cited

Cooperative Equilibrium beyond Social Dilemmas: Pareto Solvable Games

Valerio Capraro, Maria Polukarov, Matteo Venanzi +1

A recently introduced concept of "cooperative equilibrium", based on the assumption that players have a natural attitude to cooperation, has been proven a powerful tool in predicti…

cs.GT2015★ 11 cited

Incentive Design for Ridesharing with Uncertainty

Dengji Zhao, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Nicholas R. Jennings

We consider a ridesharing problem where there is uncertainty about the completion of trips from both drivers and riders. Specifically, we study ridesharing mechanisms that aim to i…

cs.GT2014

Towards a Fair Allocation of Rewards in Multi-Level Marketing

Talal Rahwan, Victor Naroditskiy, Tomasz Michalak +2

An increasing number of businesses and organisations rely on existing users for finding new users or spreading a message. One of the widely used "refer-a-friend" mechanisms offers…

cs.GT2014★ 129 cited

Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value for Game-Theoretic Network Centrality

Tomasz Pawel Michalak, Karthik V Aadithya, Piotr L. Szczepanski +2

The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. H…

cs.GT2014★ 82 cited

Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions

Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis +2

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalit…

cs.GT2014★ 28 cited

Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Task Allocation in the Presence of Execution Uncertainty

Sarvapali Dyanand Ramchurn, Claudio Mezzetti, Andrea Giovannucci +3

Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficien…

cs.GT2014★ 16 cited

Optimal Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes

Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep Kumar Dash, Andrew Byde +1

We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids lo…

cs.GT2012★ 5 cited

Matching Games with Additive Externalities

Simina Brânzei, Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan +2

Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by th…

cs.GT2012★ 11 cited

Automated Planning in Repeated Adversarial Games

Enrique Munoz de Cote, Archie C. Chapman, Adam M. Sykulski +1

Game theory's prescriptive power typically relies on full rationality and/or self-play interactions. In contrast, this work sets aside these fundamental premises and focuses instea…

cs.GT2012★ 1 cited

Filtered Fictitious Play for Perturbed Observation Potential Games and Decentralised POMDPs

Archie C. Chapman, Simon A. Williamson, Nicholas R. Jennings

Potential games and decentralised partially observable MDPs (Dec-POMDPs) are two commonly used models of multi-agent interaction, for static optimisation and sequential decisionmak…