44 citations · 99 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
Showing 2012 · cs.GTShow all
2 papers · 2 filters
cs.GT2012★ 6 cited
On Revenue Maximization with Sharp Multi-Unit Demands
Ning Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Paul. W. Goldberg +1
We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer wants a specific number of it…
cs.GT2012★ 44 cited
Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian
Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Nick Gravin +1
Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer(auctioneer) aims to maximize a soci…