44 citations · 99 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers · 1 filter
Competitive analysis via benchmark decomposition
Ning Chen, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu
We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable par…
Optimal Competitive Auctions
Ning Chen, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu
We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-…
On Revenue Maximization with Sharp Multi-Unit Demands
Ning Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Paul. W. Goldberg +1
We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer wants a specific number of it…
Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian
Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Nick Gravin +1
Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer(auctioneer) aims to maximize a soci…
Budget Feasible Mechanism Design via Random Sampling
Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Nick Gravin +1
Budget feasible mechanism considers algorithmic mechanism design questions where there is a budget constraint on the total payment of the mechanism. An important question in the fi…
Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching
Ning Chen, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu
Mechanism design without money has a rich history in social choice literature. Due to the strong impossibility theorem by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, exploring domains in which ther…