44 citations · 99 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers
Competitive analysis via benchmark decomposition
Ning Chen, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu
We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable par…
Optimal Competitive Auctions
Ning Chen, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu
We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-…
Solving Linear Programming with Constraints Unknown
Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Shengyu Zhang
What is the value of input information in solving linear programming? The celebrated ellipsoid algorithm tells us that the full information of input constraints is not necessary; t…
On Revenue Maximization with Sharp Multi-Unit Demands
Ning Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Paul. W. Goldberg +1
We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer wants a specific number of it…
On the Complexity of Trial and Error
Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Shengyu Zhang
Motivated by certain applications from physics, biochemistry, economics, and computer science, in which the objects under investigation are not accessible because of various limita…
Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian
Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Nick Gravin +1
Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer(auctioneer) aims to maximize a soci…