6 citations · 9 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
The revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action
Haoyang Wu
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' private types. The…
Profitable Bayesian implementation in one-shot mechanism settings
Haoyang Wu
In the mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of all agents' ty…
A note on the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism when strategies of agents are costly actions
Haoyang Wu
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' types. To…
Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet
Haoyang Wu
The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we propose that if agents report messages to the designer through channels (e.g., Inter…
Subgame perfect implementation: A new result
Haoyang Wu
This paper concerns what will happen if quantum mechanics is concerned in subgame perfect implementation. The main result is: When additional conditions are satisfied, the traditio…
Quantum Bayesian implementation
Haoyang Wu
Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian imple…