Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result

Abstract

[J. Moore and R. Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [B. Dutta and A. Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128] are two important papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Recently, [H. Wu, Quantum mechanism helps agents combat "bad" social choice rules. \emph{International Journal of Quantum Information}, 2010 (accepted). abs/1002.4294 ] broke through traditional results on Nash implementation with three or more agents. In this paper, we will investigate two-agent Nash implementation by virtue of Wu's quantum mechanism. The main result is: A two-agent social choice rule that satisfies Condition $\mu 2$ will no longer be Nash implementable if an additional Condition ${\lambda }^{\prime }$ is satisfied. Moreover, according to a classical two-agent algorithm, this result holds not only in the quantum world, but also in the macro world.

15 pages, 4 figures

References in corpus (1)

• On amending the Maskin's sufficiency theorem by using complex numbers