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cs.GT2026
Enhancing Affine Maximizer Auctions with Correlation-Aware Payment
Haoran Sun, Xuanzhi Xia, Xu Chu +1
Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibi…
cs.GT2024
Mechanism Design for LLM Fine-tuning with Multiple Reward Models
Haoran Sun, Yurong Chen, Siwei Wang +3
Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) to aggregate multiple preferences has attracted considerable research attention. With aggregation algorithms advancing, a potential economi…
cs.GT2024
Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?
Yurong Chen, Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng +1
This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whethe…