2 citations · 2 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Strategic Disclosure of Action Space in Principal-Agent Contracts
Xiaotie Deng, Ningyuan Li
We study strategic disclosure of the action space in principal-agent contracting, where an agent selects a disclosed action set to shape the principal's perception of her capabilit…
Ad Insertion in LLM-Generated Responses
Shengwei Xu, Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng +2
Sustainable monetization of large language models (LLMs) remains a critical open challenge. Traditional search advertising, which relies on static keywords, fails to capture the fl…
Prrr: Personal Random Rewards for Blockchain Reporting
Hongyin Chen, Yubin Ke, Xiaotie Deng +1
Smart contracts, the stateful programs running on blockchains, often rely on reports. Publishers are paid to publish these reports on the blockchain. Designing protocols that incen…
Ex-Ante Truthful Distribution-Reporting Mechanisms
Xiaotie Deng, Yanru Guan, Ningyuan Li +2
This paper studies mechanism design for revenue maximization in a distribution-reporting setting, where the auctioneer does not know the buyers' true value distributions. Instead,…
Beyond Advertising: Mechanism Design for Platform-Wide Marketing Service "QuanZhanTui"
Ningyuan Li, Zhilin Zhang, Tianyan Long +8
On e-commerce platforms, sellers typically bid for impressions from ad traffic to promote their products. However, for most sellers, the majority of their sales come from organic t…
Optimal Prize Design in Parallel Rank-order Contests
Xiaotie Deng, Ningyuan Li, Weian Li +1
This paper investigates a two-stage game-theoretical model with multiple parallel rank-order contests. In this model, each contest designer sets up a contest and determines the pri…
An Adaptable Budget Planner for Enhancing Budget-Constrained Auto-Bidding in Online Advertising
Zhijian Duan, Yusen Huo, Tianyu Wang +6
In online advertising, advertisers commonly utilize auto-bidding services to bid for impression opportunities. A typical objective of the auto-bidder is to optimize the advertiser'…
Aggregation of Antagonistic Contingent Preferences: When Is It Possible?
Xiaotie Deng, Biaoshuai Tao, Ying Wang
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state.…
Automated Deterministic Auction Design with Objective Decomposition
Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yichong Xia +6
Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While t…
Competition among Pairwise Lottery Contests
Xiaotie Deng, Hangxin Gan, Ningyuan Li +2
We investigate a two-stage competitive model involving multiple contests. In this model, each contest designer chooses two participants from a pool of candidate contestants and det…
Learning against Non-credible Auctions
Qian Wang, Xuanzhi Xia, Zongjun Yang +7
The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller m…