6 citations · 25 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
18 papers
Equilibrium Analysis of Customer Attraction Games
Xiaotie Deng, Hangxin Gan, Ningyuan Li +2
We introduce a game model called "customer attraction game" to demonstrate the competition among online content providers. In this model, customers exhibit interest in various topi…
Coordinated Dynamic Bidding in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Budgets
Yurong Chen, Qian Wang, Zhijian Duan +4
In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and…
A Scalable Neural Network for DSIC Affine Maximizer Auction Design
Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yurong Chen +1
Automated auction design aims to find empirically high-revenue mechanisms through machine learning. Existing works on multi item auction scenarios can be roughly divided into Regre…
Learning to Bid in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Budgets
Qian Wang, Zongjun Yang, Xiaotie Deng +1
Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainl…
Learning to Manipulate a Commitment Optimizer
Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Jiarui Gan +1
It is shown in recent studies that in a Stackelberg game the follower can manipulate the leader by deviating from their true best-response behavior. Such manipulations are computat…
Are Equivariant Equilibrium Approximators Beneficial?
Zhijian Duan, Yunxuan Ma, Xiaotie Deng
Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximat…
Sybil-Proof Diffusion Auction in Social Networks
Hongyin Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Ying Wang +2
A diffusion auction is a market to sell commodities over a social network, where the challenge is to incentivize existing buyers to invite their neighbors in the network to join th…
Contextual Decision-Making with Knapsacks Beyond the Worst Case
Zhaohua Chen, Rui Ai, Mingwei Yang +3
We study the framework of a dynamic decision-making scenario with resource constraints. In this framework, an agent, whose target is to maximize the total reward under the initial…
Competition among Parallel Contests
Xiaotie Deng, Ningyuan Li, Weian Li +1
We investigate the model of multiple contests held in parallel, where each contestant selects one contest to join and each contest designer decides the prize structure to compete f…
Dynamic Budget Throttling in Repeated Second-Price Auctions
Zhaohua Chen, Chang Wang, Qian Wang +6
In today's online advertising markets, a crucial requirement for an advertiser is to control her total expenditure within a time horizon under some budget. Among various budget con…
Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commitment in Extensive-form Games
Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li
To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the fo…
Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors: Strategic Equivalence and Structural Properties
Zhaohua Chen, Mingwei Yang, Chang Wang +5
In today's online advertising markets, it is common for advertisers to set long-term budgets. Correspondingly, advertising platforms adopt budget control methods to ensure that adv…
Insightful Mining Equilibria
Mengqian Zhang, Yuhao Li, Jichen Li +2
The selfish mining attack, arguably the most famous game-theoretic attack in blockchain, indicates that the Bitcoin protocol is not incentive-compatible. Most subsequent works main…
ABSNFT: Securitization and Repurchase Scheme for Non-Fungible Tokens Based on Game Theoretical Analysis
Hongyin Chen, Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng +2
The Non-Fungible Token (NFT) is viewed as one of the important applications of blockchain technology. Although NFT has a large market scale and multiple practical standards, severa…
An Efficient and Robust Committee Structure for Sharding Blockchain
Mengqian Zhang, Jichen Li, Zhaohua Chen +2
Nowadays, sharding is deemed as a promising way to save traditional blockchain protocols from their low scalability. However, such technique also brings several potential risks and…
Is Nash Equilibrium Approximator Learnable?
Zhijian Duan, Wenhan Huang, Dinghuai Zhang +4
In this paper, we investigate the learnability of the function approximator that approximates Nash equilibrium (NE) for games generated from a distribution. First, we offer a gener…
From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail
Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi +2
We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design, where the goal of the contest designers is to maximiz…
On Tightness of Tsaknakis-Spirakis Descent Methods for Approximate Nash Equilibria
Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Wenhan Huang +2
This article explores the minimum approximation ratio for Nash equilibrium in bi-matrix games, focusing on the Tsaknakis and Spirakis (TS) methods. The previous SOTA, TS algorithm,…