26 citations · 32 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
The Maxmin Value of Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side and Tail-Measurable Payoffs
Gil Bar Castellon Koltun, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan
We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff).…
Bayesian Dissuasion with Bandit Exploration
Massimo DAntoni, Ehud Lehrer, Avraham Tabbach +1
We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and…
Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs
Dario Bauso, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan +1
We introduce the concept of attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs. A set of payoff vectors is called {\em attainable} if player 1 can ensure t…
Equilibrium payoffs in finite games
Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan, Yannick Viossat
We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R^2 is shown to be the set of N…