26 citations · 32 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
Bayesian Sequential Search with Censored Observations
Ehud Lehrer, Daniel Z. Li
This paper studies how information censoring enables a myopic cutoff rule in Bayesian sequential search. Under full information, Bayesian learning generally destroys the monotonici…
Strategic Heterogeneity: Welfare Gains from Secession and Immigration
Mauro Bambi, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan
This paper investigates the strategic and welfare properties of endogenous population partitioning (secession) within large-population anonymous games featuring strategic heterogen…
The Structure of Joint Posterior Beliefs
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
We analyze information structures in environments with privately informed agents and a partially informed mediator who provides public signals. Necessary and sufficient conditions,…
Public Information Generators: Common Knowledge and Information Loops
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with privately informed players. One oracle dominates another if, for every experiment of the la…
A Taste for Variety
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Dominik Karos, Ehud Lehrer
A decision maker repeatedly chooses one of a finite set of actions. In each period, the decision maker's payoff depends on fixed basic payoff of the chosen action and the frequency…
The Value of Information in Stopping Problems
Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang
We consider stopping problems in which a decision maker (DM) faces an unknown state of nature and decides sequentially whether to stop and take an irreversible action; pay a fee an…
Dynamic screening
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
We study dynamic screening problems where elements are subjected to noisy evaluations and, in every stage, some of the elements are rejected while the remaining ones are independen…
Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations
Ehud Lehrer, Dimitry Shaiderman
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, whil…
Markovian Persuasion
Ehud Lehrer, Dimitry Shaiderman
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, whil…