26 citations · 32 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
18 papers
Bayesian Sequential Search with Censored Observations
Ehud Lehrer, Daniel Z. Li
This paper studies how information censoring enables a myopic cutoff rule in Bayesian sequential search. Under full information, Bayesian learning generally destroys the monotonici…
Strategic Heterogeneity: Welfare Gains from Secession and Immigration
Mauro Bambi, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan
This paper investigates the strategic and welfare properties of endogenous population partitioning (secession) within large-population anonymous games featuring strategic heterogen…
The Maxmin Value of Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side and Tail-Measurable Payoffs
Gil Bar Castellon Koltun, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan
We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff).…
The Structure of Joint Posterior Beliefs
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
We analyze information structures in environments with privately informed agents and a partially informed mediator who provides public signals. Necessary and sufficient conditions,…
Public Information Generators: Common Knowledge and Information Loops
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with privately informed players. One oracle dominates another if, for every experiment of the la…
A Taste for Variety
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Dominik Karos, Ehud Lehrer
A decision maker repeatedly chooses one of a finite set of actions. In each period, the decision maker's payoff depends on fixed basic payoff of the chosen action and the frequency…
Choosing a consultant in a dynamic investment problem
Yuval Cornfeld, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan
Consider a dynamic decision-making scenario where at every stage the investor has to choose between investing in one of two projects or gathering more information. At each stage, t…
Bayesian Dissuasion with Bandit Exploration
Massimo DAntoni, Ehud Lehrer, Avraham Tabbach +1
We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and…
The Value of Information in Stopping Problems
Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang
We consider stopping problems in which a decision maker (DM) faces an unknown state of nature and decides sequentially whether to stop and take an irreversible action; pay a fee an…
Dynamic screening
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
We study dynamic screening problems where elements are subjected to noisy evaluations and, in every stage, some of the elements are rejected while the remaining ones are independen…
Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations
Ehud Lehrer, Dimitry Shaiderman
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, whil…
Markovian Persuasion
Ehud Lehrer, Dimitry Shaiderman
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, whil…
The Value Functions of Markov Decision Processes
Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan, Omri N. Solan
We provide a full characterization of the set of value functions of Markov decision processes.
On the Failures of Bonus Plans
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
A decision maker (DM) has some funds invested through two investment firms. She wishes to allocate additional funds according to the firms' earnings. The DM, on the one hand, tries…
On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games
Ehud Lehrer, Marco Scarsini
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow th…
Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs
Dario Bauso, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan +1
We introduce the concept of attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs. A set of payoff vectors is called {\em attainable} if player 1 can ensure t…
Equilibrium payoffs in finite games
Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan, Yannick Viossat
We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R^2 is shown to be the set of N…
A Subjective Approach to Quantum Probability
E. Lehrer, E. Shmaya
A likelihood order is defined over linear subspaces of a finite dimensional Hilbert space. It is shown that such an order that satisfies some plausible axioms can be represented by…