3 citations · 7 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections
Patrick Becker, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters
We settle the main open question in the theory of approval-based multi-winner elections: we show that there always exists a committee in the core. The core is a stability and group…
Individual Fairness in Budget Aggregation
Xiaohui Bei, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger +3
We consider the problem of aggregating individual distributions over alternatives into a collective distribution, also known as budget aggregation. Existing fairness notion…
Core Existence in Approval-Based Committee Elections with up to Seven Voter Types
Patrick Becker, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters
In an approval-based committee election, the task is to select a committee of up to candidates from a set of candidates based on the preferences of voters, each of whom…
Efficiently Computing Equilibria in Budget-Aggregation Games
Patrick Becker, Alexander Fries, Matthias Greger +1
Budget aggregation deals with the social choice problem of distributing an exogenously given budget among a set of public projects, given agents' preferences. Taking a game-theoret…
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preference Domains
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi +1
We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof…
Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences
Edith Elkind, Matthias Greger, Patrick Lederer +2
We study a portioning setting in which a public resource such as time or money is to be divided among a given set of candidates, and each agent proposes a division of the resource.…
Coordinating Charitable Donations with Leontief Preferences
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi +1
We consider the problem of funding public goods that are complementary in nature. Examples include charities handling different needs (e.g., protecting animals vs. providing health…
Towards a Characterization of Random Serial Dictatorship
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, René Romen
Random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a randomized assignment rule that - given a set of agents with strict preferences over houses - satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex…