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cs.GT2026
Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections
Patrick Becker, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters
We resolve the central open question in the theory of approval-based committee elections: we prove that the core is always non-empty. This means that there always exists a committe…
cs.GT2026
Individual Fairness in Budget Aggregation
Xiaohui Bei, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger +3
We consider the problem of aggregating individual distributions over alternatives into a collective distribution, also known as budget aggregation. Existing fairness notion…
cs.GT2026
Core Existence in Approval-Based Committee Elections with up to Seven Voter Types
Patrick Becker, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters
In an approval-based committee election, the task is to select a committee of up to candidates from a set of candidates based on the preferences of voters, each of whom…