60 citations · 140 across the 33 of their papers we have counts for
42 papers
Auction Design with a Bit of Information
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Jacob D. Leshno +1
Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can access a binary signal about two bidders` joint values. We explore what kind of information is most valuable to the seller by studying…
Welfare Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Improved Approximation Guarantees Beyond the Fixed Price Barrier
Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker
We study the setting of welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where the values of both the buyer and the seller are drawn from independent distributions. Our goal is to maximize…
Interdependent Bilateral Trade: Information vs Approximation
Shahar Dobzinski, Alon Eden, Kira Goldner +2
Welfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years. Previous literature obtained incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms only for the privat…
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees
Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrak
We study incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the Nash Social Welfare. Since traditional incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot maximize the Nash Social Welfare even appro…
A constant factor approximation for Nash social welfare with subadditive valuations
Shahar Dobzinski, Wenzheng Li, Aviad Rubinstein +1
We present a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization problem with subadditive valuations accessible via demand queries. More generally, we…
Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values
Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker
We study the bilateral trade problem where a seller owns a single indivisible item, and a potential buyer seeks to purchase it. Previous mechanisms for this problem only considered…