activity
20092026
most citedOn the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design

60 citations · 140 across the 33 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing cs.GTShow all

39 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2026

Welfare Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Improved Approximation Guarantees Beyond the Fixed Price Barrier

Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker

We study the setting of welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where the values of both the buyer and the seller are drawn from independent distributions. Our goal is to maximize…

cs.GT2025

Interdependent Bilateral Trade: Information vs Approximation

Shahar Dobzinski, Alon Eden, Kira Goldner +2

Welfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years. Previous literature obtained incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms only for the privat…

cs.GT2024

Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees

Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrak

We study incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the Nash Social Welfare. Since traditional incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot maximize the Nash Social Welfare even appro…

cs.GT2023★ 2 cited

A constant factor approximation for Nash social welfare with subadditive valuations

Shahar Dobzinski, Wenzheng Li, Aviad Rubinstein +1

We present a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization problem with subadditive valuations accessible via demand queries. More generally, we…

cs.GT2023

Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values

Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker

We study the bilateral trade problem where a seller owns a single indivisible item, and a potential buyer seeks to purchase it. Previous mechanisms for this problem only considered…

cs.GT2023

On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings

Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron

We explore the performance of polynomial-time incentive-compatible mechanisms in single-crossing domains. Single-crossing domains were extensively studied in the economics literatu…