60 citations · 140 across the 33 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Truthfulness via Proxies
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
This short note exhibits a truthful-in-expectation -approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that uses polynomia…
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there…
An Impossibility Result for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
Shahar Dobzinski
We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides approximation to the social welf…
Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e., are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of $1…