18 citations · 55 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
Showing 2013 · cs.GTShow all
2 papers · 2 filters
cs.GT2013★ 14 cited
Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
Paul Duetting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maxi…
cs.GT2013★ 1 cited
Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions
Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer, David C. Parkes
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances.…