2 citations · 4 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Optimal Online Stochastic Matching
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Mathieu Molina
We resolve the problem of unweighted online stochastic matching with a known arrival law by establishing its optimal competitive ratio. For Poisson arrivals, we achieve $1-e/e^e\ap…
An Introduction to Contract Theory for Computer Scientists
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
This survey introduces contract design to computer scientists: using outcome-based payments to incentivize effort. We discuss applications that motivate a computational approach to…
Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information
Dirk Bergemann, Marek Bojko, Paul Dütting +3
We study mechanism design in environments where agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. In such settings with multi-dimensiona…
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities
Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting +3
We study the classic single-choice prophet inequality problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the -competition complexity of different t…
Prophet Secretary Against the Online Optimal
Paul Dütting, Evangelia Gergatsouli, Rojin Rezvan +2
We study the prophet secretary problem, a well-studied variant of the classic prophet inequality, where values are drawn from independent known distributions but arrive in uniforml…
Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the h…
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics
Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan +2
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981, but…
Best-Response Dynamics in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim
In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, agents participate in multiple single-item second-price auctions at once. As some items might be substitutes, agents need to strategiz…
Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round
Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Éva Tardos
Many algorithms that are originally designed without explicitly considering incentive properties are later combined with simple pricing rules and used as mechanisms. The resulting…