18 citations · 55 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers · 1 filter
Price Manipulability in First-Price Auctions
Johannes Brustle, Paul Dütting, Balasubramanian Sivan
First-price auctions have many desirable properties, including uniquely possessing some, like credibility. However, first-price auctions are also inherently non-truthful, and non-t…
Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort
Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Economic theory distinguishes between principal-agent settings in which the agent has a private type and settings in which the agent takes a hidden action. Many practical problems,…
Combinatorial Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset o…
An O(log log m) Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions
Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier
Prophet inequalities compare the expected performance of an online algorithm for a stochastic optimization problem to the expected optimal solution in hindsight. They are a major a…
Efficient Two-Sided Markets with Limited Information
Paul Dütting, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos +2
A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resu…
Revenue Gaps for Static and Dynamic Posted Pricing of Homogeneous Goods
Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, Max Klimm
We consider the problem of maximizing the expected revenue from selling homogeneous goods to unit-demand buyers who arrive sequentially with independent and identically dis…