18 citations · 55 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
Showing 2012 · cs.GTShow all
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cs.GT2012★ 5 cited
Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits
Paul Duetting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show…
cs.GT2012★ 1 cited
Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers
Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer, Pitchayut Jirapinyo +3
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requir…