activity
20092026
most citedGame-Theoretic Modeling of Human Adaptation in Human-Robot Collaboration

77 citations · 367 across the 40 of their papers we have counts for

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31 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2026

Social Choice Foundations for Simulation-Augmented Generation

Sonja Kraiczy, Smitha Milli, Ratip Emin Berker +6

Simulation-augmented generation (SAGE) is a recent technical proposal in which models simulate individuals' viewpoints at inference time in order to provide more representative ans…

cs.GT2025

Generative Social Choice: The Next Generation

Niclas Boehmer, Sara Fish, Ariel D. Procaccia

A key task in certain democratic processes is to produce a concise slate of statements that proportionally represents the full spectrum of user opinions. This task is similar to co…

cs.GT2024

Honor Among Bandits: No-Regret Learning for Online Fair Division

Ariel D. Procaccia, Benjamin Schiffer, Shirley Zhang

We consider the problem of online fair division of indivisible goods to players when there are a finite number of types of goods and player values are drawn from distributions with…

cs.GT2024

Multi-Apartment Rent Division

Ariel D. Procaccia, Benjamin Schiffer, Shirley Zhang

Rent division is the well-studied problem of fairly assigning rooms and dividing rent among a set of roommates within a single apartment. A shortcoming of existing solutions is tha…

cs.GT2023★ 3 cited

Generative Social Choice

Sara Fish, Paul Gölz, David C. Parkes +4

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions su…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

The Distortion of Binomial Voting Defies Expectation

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gregory Kehne, Ariel D. Procaccia +2

In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outc…

cs.GT2023

You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It Too

Gerdus Benadè, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jamie Tucker-Foltz

The design of algorithms for political redistricting generally takes one of two approaches: optimize an objective such as compactness or, drawing on fair division, construct a prot…

cs.GT2023

Distortion Under Public-Spirited Voting

Bailey Flanigan, Ariel D. Procaccia, Sven Wang

A key promise of democratic voting is that, by accounting for all constituents' preferences, it produces decisions that benefit the constituency overall. It is alarming, then, that…

cs.GT2022

Representation with Incomplete Votes

Daniel Halpern, Gregory Kehne, Ariel D. Procaccia +2

Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with…

cs.GT2022

Welfare-Maximizing Pooled Testing

Simon Finster, Michelle González Amador, Edwin Lock +3

Pooled testing increases the reach of scarce diagnostic resources, but optimally composing pools for individuals differing in infection risk and the utility they derive from a nega…

cs.GT2022★ 3 cited

In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins

Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ariel D. Procaccia

Apportionment is the problem of distributing indivisible seats across states in proportion to the states' populations. In the context of the US House of Representatives, this p…

cs.GT2021★ 11 cited

Dynamic Placement in Refugee Resettlement

Narges Ahani, Paul Gölz, Ariel D. Procaccia +2

Employment outcomes of resettled refugees depend strongly on where they are placed inside the host country. Each week, a resettlement agency is assigned a batch of refugees by the…

cs.GT2021

District-Fair Participatory Budgeting

D Ellis Hershkowitz, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters +1

Participatory budgeting is a method used by city governments to select public projects to fund based on residents' votes. Many cities use participatory budgeting at a district leve…

cs.GT2020

Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All

Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas +1

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents. Prior research focuses on additive agent preferences, which leads to an impossibility when seeking truthfulness, fairnes…

cs.GT2020★ 8 cited

Neutralizing Self-Selection Bias in Sampling for Sortition

Bailey Flanigan, Paul Gölz, Anupam Gupta +1

Sortition is a political system in which decisions are made by panels of randomly selected citizens. The process for selecting a sortition panel is traditionally thought of as unif…

cs.GT2018★ 16 cited

Migration as Submodular Optimization

Paul Gölz, Ariel D. Procaccia

Migration presents sweeping societal challenges that have recently attracted significant attention from the scientific community. One of the prominent approaches that have been sug…

cs.GT2018★ 39 cited

The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy

Paul Gölz, Anson Kahng, Simon Mackenzie +1

Liquid democracy is the principle of making collective decisions by letting agents transitively delegate their votes. Despite its significant appeal, it has become apparent that a…

cs.GT2018★ 10 cited

Fairly Allocating Many Goods with Few Queries

Hoon Oh, Ariel D. Procaccia, Warut Suksompong

We investigate the query complexity of the fair allocation of indivisible goods. For two agents with arbitrary monotonic utilities, we design an algorithm that computes an allocati…

cs.GT2018

Strategyproof Linear Regression in High Dimensions

Yiling Chen, Chara Podimata, Ariel D. Procaccia +1

This paper is part of an emerging line of work at the intersection of machine learning and mechanism design, which aims to avoid noise in training data by correctly aligning the in…

cs.GT2017★ 24 cited

A partisan districting protocol with provably nonpartisan outcomes

Wesley Pegden, Ariel D. Procaccia, Dingli Yu

We design and analyze a protocol for dividing a state into districts, where parties take turns proposing a division, and freezing a district from the other party's proposed divisio…

cs.GT2017

Weighted Voting Via No-Regret Learning

Nika Haghtalab, Ritesh Noothigattu, Ariel D. Procaccia

Voting systems typically treat all voters equally. We argue that perhaps they should not: Voters who have supported good choices in the past should be given higher weight than vote…

cs.GT2015

Learning Cooperative Games

Maria-Florina Balcan, Ariel D. Procaccia, Yair Zick

This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given random samples of coalitions and their values, taken…

cs.GT2015★ 17 cited

Influence in Classification via Cooperative Game Theory

Amit Datta, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia +1

A dataset has been classified by some unknown classifier into two types of points. What were the most important factors in determining the classification outcome? In this work, we…

cs.GT2014

Verifiably Truthful Mechanisms

Simina Brânzei, Ariel D. Procaccia

It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechan…