2 citations · 4 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers
Online Competitive Information Gathering for Partially Observable Trajectory Games
Mel Krusniak, Hang Xu, Parker Palermo +1
Game-theoretic agents must make plans that optimally gather information about their opponents. These problems are modeled by partially observable stochastic games (POSGs), but plan…
Locally Optimal Solutions for Integer Programming Games
Pravesh Koirala, Mel Krusniak, Forrest Laine
Integer programming games (IPGs) are n-person games with integer strategy spaces. These games are used to model non-cooperative combinatorial decision-making and are used in domain…
Polyhedral Collision Detection via Vertex Enumeration
Andrew Cinar, Yue Zhao, Forrest Laine
Collision detection is a critical functionality for robotics. The degree to which objects collide cannot be represented as a continuously differentiable function for any shapes oth…
Algorithmic collusion in a two-sided market: A rideshare example
Pravesh Koirala, Forrest Laine
With dynamic pricing on the rise, firms are using sophisticated algorithms for price determination. These algorithms are often non-interpretable and there has been a recent interes…
Decreasing Wages in Gig Economy: A Game Theoretic Explanation Using Mathematical Program Networks
Pravesh Koirala, Forrest Laine
Gig economy consists of two market groups connected via an intermediary. Popular examples are rideshares where passengers and drivers are mediated via platforms such as Uber and Ly…
Mixed Strategy Constraints in Continuous Games
Mel Krusniak, Forrest Laine
When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instanc…
Does bilevel optimization result in more competitive racing behavior?
Andrew Cinar, Forrest Laine
Two-vehicle racing is natural example of a competitive dynamic game. As with most dynamic games, there are many ways in which the underlying solution concept can be structured, res…
Monte Carlo Optimization for Solving Multilevel Stackelberg Games
Pravesh Koirala, Forrest Laine
Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games r…
Compelling ReLU Networks to Exhibit Exponentially Many Linear Regions at Initialization and During Training
Max Milkert, David Hyde, Forrest Laine
In a neural network with ReLU activations, the number of piecewise linear regions in the output can grow exponentially with depth. However, this is highly unlikely to happen when t…
QTOS: An Open-Source Quadruped Trajectory Optimization Stack
Alexy Skoutnev, Andrew Cinar, Praful Sigdel +1
We introduce a new open-source framework, Quadruped Trajectory Optimization Stack (QTOS), which integrates a global planner, local planner, simulator, controller, and robot interfa…