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20232025
most citedMonte Carlo Optimization for Solving Multilevel Stackelberg Games

2 citations · 4 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for

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7 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2025

Online Competitive Information Gathering for Partially Observable Trajectory Games

Mel Krusniak, Hang Xu, Parker Palermo +1

Game-theoretic agents must make plans that optimally gather information about their opponents. These problems are modeled by partially observable stochastic games (POSGs), but plan…

cs.GT2025

Locally Optimal Solutions for Integer Programming Games

Pravesh Koirala, Mel Krusniak, Forrest Laine

Integer programming games (IPGs) are n-person games with integer strategy spaces. These games are used to model non-cooperative combinatorial decision-making and are used in domain…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

Algorithmic collusion in a two-sided market: A rideshare example

Pravesh Koirala, Forrest Laine

With dynamic pricing on the rise, firms are using sophisticated algorithms for price determination. These algorithms are often non-interpretable and there has been a recent interes…

cs.GT2024

Decreasing Wages in Gig Economy: A Game Theoretic Explanation Using Mathematical Program Networks

Pravesh Koirala, Forrest Laine

Gig economy consists of two market groups connected via an intermediary. Popular examples are rideshares where passengers and drivers are mediated via platforms such as Uber and Ly…

cs.GT2024

Mixed Strategy Constraints in Continuous Games

Mel Krusniak, Forrest Laine

When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instanc…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

Does bilevel optimization result in more competitive racing behavior?

Andrew Cinar, Forrest Laine

Two-vehicle racing is natural example of a competitive dynamic game. As with most dynamic games, there are many ways in which the underlying solution concept can be structured, res…

cs.GT2023★ 2 cited

Monte Carlo Optimization for Solving Multilevel Stackelberg Games

Pravesh Koirala, Forrest Laine

Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games r…