1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
cs.GT2025
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity
Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Linda Cai, Yiding Feng +2
We quantify the value of the monopoly's bargaining power in terms of competition complexity--that is, the number of additional bidders the monopoly must attract in simple auctions…
cs.GT2024★ 1 cited
Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-based Mechanisms for all Approximation Guarantees
Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider truthful combinatorial auctions with items for sale to bidders, where each bidder has a private monotone valuation . Among truthful…
cs.GT2024
Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items
Mahsa Derakhshan, Emily Ryu, S. Matthew Weinberg +1
The competition complexity of an auction setting is the number of additional bidders needed such that the simple mechanism of selling items separately (with additional bidders) ach…