8 citations · 11 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users
Amit Levy, S. Matthew Weinberg, Chenghan Zhou
We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contes…
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Roughgarden (2020) initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a ``good'' TFM should be on-chain simple (OnCS), i.e., incentive c…
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considere…
Profitable Manipulations of Cryptographic Self-Selection are Statistically Detectable
Linda Cai, Jingyi Liu, S. Matthew Weinberg +1
Cryptographic Self-Selection is a common primitive underlying leader-selection for Proof-of-Stake blockchain protocols. The concept was first popularized in Algorand [CM19], who al…
Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Aadityan Ganesh, Jack Hourigan +3
Cryptographic Self-Selection is a paradigm employed by modern Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols to select a block-proposing "leader." Algorand [Chen and Micali, 2019] proposes a c…