Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-based Mechanisms for all Approximation Guarantees
arXiv:2404.00831 · doi:10.1145/3618260.3649706
Abstract
We consider truthful combinatorial auctions with items for sale to bidders, where each bidder has a private monotone valuation . Among truthful mechanisms, maximal-in-range (MIR) mechanisms achieve the best-known approximation guarantees among all poly-communication deterministic truthful mechanisms in all previously-studied settings. Our work settles the communication necessary to achieve any approximation guarantee via an MIR mechanism. Specifically: Let MIRsubmod denote the best approximation guarantee achievable by an MIR mechanism using communication between bidders with submodular valuations over items. Then for all , MIRsubmod. When , this improves the previous best lower bound for poly-comm. MIR mechanisms from to . We also have MIRsubmod. Moreover, our mechanism is optimal w.r.t. the value query and succinct representation models. When , this improves the previous best approximation guarantee for poly-comm. MIR mechanisms from to . Let also MIRgen denote the best approximation guarantee achievable by an MIR mechanism using communication between bidders with general valuations over items. Then for all , MIRgen. When , this improves the previous best lower bound for poly-comm. MIR mechanisms from to . We also have MIRgen. Moreover, our mechanism is optimal w.r.t. the value query and succinct representation models. When , this improves the previous best approximation guarantee for poly-comm. MIR mechanisms from to .
40 pages, 2 figures, to appear in STOC 2024