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econ.TH2026
Strategy-proof and Efficient Job Matching with Participation Constraints
Sushil Bikhchandani, Debasis Mishra
We study the design of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms satisfying participation constraints in the job-matching problem. Each firm can hire multiple workers and each worker…
econ.TH2026
Equity in auction design with unit-demand agents and non-quasilinear preferences
Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa
We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object,…