17 citations · 28 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Strategy-proof and Efficient Job Matching with Participation Constraints
Sushil Bikhchandani, Debasis Mishra
We study the design of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms satisfying participation constraints in the job-matching problem. Each firm can hire multiple workers and each worker…
Equity in auction design with unit-demand agents and non-quasilinear preferences
Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa
We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object,…
Teacher transfers: equalizing deficits across schools
Debasis Mishra, Soumendu Sarkar, Arunava Sen +2
The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009) (RTE) of the Government of India prescribes student-teacher ratios for state-run schools. One method advocated by the Act to a…
Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
Sushil Bikhchandani, Debasis Mishra
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechan…
Symmetric reduced form voting
Xu Lang, Debasis Mishra
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule…
Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent
Debasis Mishra, Kolagani Paramahamsa
We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the obj…
Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
Komal Malik, Debasis Mishra
We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences of agents t…
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
Sulagna Dasgupta, Debasis Mishra
We explore the consequences of weakening the notion of incentive compatibility from strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC) in the random assignment m…
Selling Two Identical Objects
Sushil Bikhchandani, Debasis Mishra
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministi…
Balanced Ranking Mechanisms
Debasis Mishra, Tridib Sharma
In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our m…
Roberts' Theorem with Neutrality: A Social Welfare Ordering Approach
Debasis Mishra, Arunava Sen
We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed…