17 citations · 28 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
Showing 2020Show all
3 papers · 1 filter
econ.TH2020★ 17 cited
Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
Komal Malik, Debasis Mishra
We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences of agents t…
econ.TH2020★ 1 cited
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
Sulagna Dasgupta, Debasis Mishra
We explore the consequences of weakening the notion of incentive compatibility from strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC) in the random assignment m…
econ.TH2020★ 10 cited
Selling Two Identical Objects
Sushil Bikhchandani, Debasis Mishra
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministi…