5 papers · 2 filters
Coexistence of Shill-Proof and Non-Shill-Proof Equilibria in a Public Auction
Benjamin Marsh
A single auction can have both a shill-proof equilibrium and a non-shill-proof equilibrium in the model of Komo, Kominers, and Roughgarden. We give an explicit single item example…
Bandwidth Fee Mechanisms for Certified Transaction Dissemination
Eleftheria Fassman, Mahimna Kelkar, Benjamin Marsh +1
We study bandwidth fee mechanisms (BFMs) for pricing threshold-certified transaction dissemination before consensus. Analogous to transaction fee mechanisms for computation, BFMs p…
Slack and Budget Breaking in Threshold Team Production
Benjamin Marsh, Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa
A threshold system completes a public task only after verifiable shares are publicly committed. If the honest schedule creates \( \Nstar=κ+Δ\) share opportunities by deadline $…
SNARE: A TRAP for Rational Players to Solve Byzantine Consensus in the 5f+1 Model
Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, Benjamin Marsh
The TRAP protocol solves rational agreement by combining accountable consensus with a one-shot BFTCR finalization phase. We present SNARE (Scalable Nash Agreement via Reward and Ex…
A mechanism design overview of Sedna
Benjamin Marsh, Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa
Sedna is a coded multi-proposer consensus protocol in which a sender shards a transaction payload into rateless symbols and disseminates them across parallel proposer lanes, provid…