18 papers
Coexistence of Shill-Proof and Non-Shill-Proof Equilibria in a Public Auction
Benjamin Marsh
A single auction can have both a shill-proof equilibrium and a non-shill-proof equilibrium in the model of Komo, Kominers, and Roughgarden. We give an explicit single item example…
Bandwidth Fee Mechanisms for Certified Transaction Dissemination
Eleftheria Fassman, Mahimna Kelkar, Benjamin Marsh +1
We study bandwidth fee mechanisms (BFMs) for pricing threshold-certified transaction dissemination before consensus. Analogous to transaction fee mechanisms for computation, BFMs p…
Domain Specific Post Quantum Signatures for Blockchains
Maja Lie, Ben Marsh
Blockchains need more than post quantum single signer signatures. They need consensus profiled authentication objects with canonical bytes, priced invalid input rejection, stable t…
A BUD You Can Count On: Efficient, Verifiable Membership Proofs
Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, Cody Littley, Ben Marsh
A block typically changes only a small fraction of blockchain state, yet producing a state root makes validators update an authenticated tree spanning it all. We show how to suppor…
Finality Before Disclosure for Ledger Authenticators in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
Maja Lie, Benjamin Marsh
Public ledgers increasingly authorize state transitions using prior transactions, finalized state, timing, and ordering rather than only a public key, message, and portable signatu…
Cyclic Shuffle Groups: Universal Two-Transitivity and Complete Classification
Benjamin Marsh
Let \(k\geq 3\), \(n\geq 1\), and let \(H_{k,n}=\Sh(C_k,n)\) be the group generated by the standard \(k\) pile perfect shuffle and cyclic pile permutation on a deck of \(kn\) cards…
Hermes: Low Tail-Latency Via Prefix Consensus
Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, Dakai Kang, Neil Giridharan +3
Leader-based BFT protocols finalize through their leaders: a view whose leader is crashed or slow finalizes nothing, and the timeout that ends it admits no good setting. A conserva…
Reveal, Correct, Then Pay: Encrypted Mempools and Perpetual Funding Security
Benjamin Marsh
Encrypted mempools are designed to hide transaction contents until execution order is fixed, preventing many victim dependent forms of maximal extractable value. This paper studies…
Slack and Budget Breaking in Threshold Team Production
Benjamin Marsh, Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa
A threshold system completes a public task only after verifiable shares are publicly committed. If the honest schedule creates \( \Nstar=κ+Δ\) share opportunities by deadline $…
Ambulance: saving BFT through racing
Neil Giridharan, Shubham Mishra, Lorenzo Alvisi +5
Today's practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) state machine replication deployments are vulnerable to slowdowns. The main culprit is timeouts. Aggressive timeouts spuriously tri…
SNARE: A TRAP for Rational Players to Solve Byzantine Consensus in the 5f+1 Model
Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, Benjamin Marsh
The TRAP protocol solves rational agreement by combining accountable consensus with a one-shot BFTCR finalization phase. We present SNARE (Scalable Nash Agreement via Reward and Ex…
Meeting in the Middle: A Co-Design Paradigm for FHE and AI Inference
Bernardo Magri, Benjamin Marsh, Paul Gebheim
Modern cloud inference creates a two sided privacy problem where users reveal sensitive inputs to providers, while providers must execute proprietary model weights inside potential…
A mechanism design overview of Sedna
Benjamin Marsh, Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa
Sedna is a coded multi-proposer consensus protocol in which a sender shards a transaction payload into rateless symbols and disseminates them across parallel proposer lanes, provid…
Sedna: Sharding transactions in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains
Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, Benjamin Marsh, Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias +1
Modern blockchains increasingly adopt multi-proposer (MCP) consensus to remove single-leader bottlenecks and improve censorship resistance. However, MCP alone does not resolve how…
MEV in Multiple Concurrent Proposer Blockchains
Steven Landers, Benjamin Marsh
We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This…
A Time-Bound Signature Scheme for Blockchains
Benjamin Marsh, Paolo Serafino
We introduce a modified Schnorr signature scheme to allow for time-bound signatures for transaction fee auction bidding and smart contract purposes in a blockchain context, ensurin…
The Algorithmic Geometry of Decompression Schedules
Benjamin Marsh
We cast decompression planning as hybrid optimal control with ppO and narcotic depth feasibility, affine tissue ceilings, and convex oversaturation penalties. A rearrangement t…
Pulsar Consensus
Samer Afach, Benjamin Marsh, Enrico Rubboli
In this paper, we informally introduce the Pulsar proof of stake consensus paper and discuss the relevant design decisions and considerations. The Pulsar protocol we propose is des…