6 papers · 1 filter
Coexistence of Shill-Proof and Non-Shill-Proof Equilibria in a Public Auction
Benjamin Marsh
A single auction can have both a shill-proof equilibrium and a non-shill-proof equilibrium in the model of Komo, Kominers, and Roughgarden. We give an explicit single item example…
Bandwidth Fee Mechanisms for Certified Transaction Dissemination
Eleftheria Fassman, Mahimna Kelkar, Benjamin Marsh +1
We study bandwidth fee mechanisms (BFMs) for pricing threshold-certified transaction dissemination before consensus. Analogous to transaction fee mechanisms for computation, BFMs p…
Slack and Budget Breaking in Threshold Team Production
Benjamin Marsh, Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa
A threshold system completes a public task only after verifiable shares are publicly committed. If the honest schedule creates \( \Nstar=κ+Δ\) share opportunities by deadline $…
SNARE: A TRAP for Rational Players to Solve Byzantine Consensus in the 5f+1 Model
Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, Benjamin Marsh
The TRAP protocol solves rational agreement by combining accountable consensus with a one-shot BFTCR finalization phase. We present SNARE (Scalable Nash Agreement via Reward and Ex…
A mechanism design overview of Sedna
Benjamin Marsh, Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa
Sedna is a coded multi-proposer consensus protocol in which a sender shards a transaction payload into rateless symbols and disseminates them across parallel proposer lanes, provid…
MEV in Multiple Concurrent Proposer Blockchains
Steven Landers, Benjamin Marsh
We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This…