2 citations · 2 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Check, Please: Verifiably Fair Clustering
Yu He, Jeremy Vollen, Edith Elkind
Popular centroid-based clustering methods are typically optimized for global objectives, and may fail to adequately represent large groups of datapoints. Thus, one needs proportion…
Single-Deviation Stability in Additively Separable Hedonic Games with Constrained Coalition Sizes
Martin Bullinger, Adam Dunajski, Edith Elkind +1
We study stability in additively separable hedonic games when coalition sizes have to respect fixed size bounds. We consider four classic notions of stability based on single-agent…
A Lower Bound for Local Search Proportional Approval Voting
Sonja Kraiczy, Edith Elkind
Selecting out of items based on the preferences of heterogeneous agents is a widely studied problem in algorithmic game theory. If agents have approval preferences over…
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir +4
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players…