122 citations · 535 across the 52 of their papers we have counts for
64 papers
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstention: a PSPACE-Completeness Result for Restricted Ballots
Edith Elkind
We consider sequential Plurality elections in which each voter may abstain or vote for a single candidate. Each voter assigns utilities to all candidates; for each voter, this indu…
Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences
Edith Elkind, Matthias Greger, Patrick Lederer +2
We study a portioning setting in which a public resource such as time or money is to be divided among a given set of candidates, and each agent proposes a division of the resource.…
Selecting Representative Bodies: An Axiomatic View
Manon Revel, Niclas Boehmer, Rachael Colley +3
As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and also computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) me…
k-Prize Weighted Voting Games
Wei-Chen Lee, David Hyland, Alessandro Abate +5
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly…
Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy
Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg
We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific cri…
Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reduction
Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Laurent Bulteau, Edith Elkind +2
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is bette…