activity
20232026
most citedTemporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionality

2 citations · 4 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

14 papers

cs.GT2026

Multiwinner Voting with Spatial Preferences under Incomplete Information

Drew Springham, Edith Elkind, Bart de Keijzer +1

In multiwinner elections with many candidates, as in participatory budgeting or large-scale recommendation, voters cannot plausibly evaluate every candidate, yet standard proportio…

cs.GT2026

Fair and Efficient Investment in Public Transportation

Martin Bullinger, Edith Elkind, Kassian Köck

We study a stylized model of infrastructure investment in public transportation. In our model, each agent travels between a pair of terminals in a network captured by a weighted gr…

cs.GT2025

Multiwinner Voting with Interval Preferences under Incomplete Information

Drew Springham, Edith Elkind, Bart de Keijzer +1

In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explo…

cs.GT2025

Selecting Interlacing Committees

Chris Dong, Martin Bullinger, Tomasz Wąs +2

Polarization is a major concern for a well-functioning society. Often, mass polarization of a society is driven by polarizing political representation, even when the latter is easi…

cs.GT2025

Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chores

Edith Elkind, Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh

We study a temporal voting model where voters have dynamic preferences over a set of public chores -- projects that benefit society, but impose individual costs on those affected b…

cs.GT2025

Strengthening Proportionality in Temporal Voting

Bradley Phillips, Edith Elkind, Nicholas Teh +1

We study proportional representation in the framework of temporal voting with approval ballots. Prior work adapted basic proportional representation concepts -- justified represent…

cs.GT2025

Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting

Edith Elkind, Svetlana Obraztsova, Jannik Peters +1

We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate…

cs.GT2024

Towards Fair and Efficient Public Transportation: A Bus Stop Model

Martin Bullinger, Edith Elkind, Mohamad Latifian

We consider a stylized formal model of public transportation, where a set of agents need to travel along a given road, and there is a bus that runs the length of this road. Each ag…

cs.GT2024

Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints

Edith Elkind, Ayumi Igarashi, Nicholas Teh

We study fair allocation of indivisible chores to agents under budget constraints, where each chore has an objective size and disutility. This model captures scenarios where a set…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Items

Edith Elkind, Alexander Lam, Mohamad Latifian +2

We study a fair division model where indivisible items arrive sequentially, and must be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Previous work on online fair division has shown impos…

cs.GT2024

Multiwinner Temporal Voting with Aversion to Change

Valentin Zech, Niclas Boehmer, Edith Elkind +1

We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in i…

cs.GT2024★ 2 cited

Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionality

Edith Elkind, Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh

We investigate a model of sequential decision-making where a single alternative is chosen at each round. We focus on two objectives -- utilitarian welfare (Util) and egalitarian we…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting

Edith Elkind, Svetlana Obraztsova, Nicholas Teh

Multiwinner voting captures a wide variety of settings, from parliamentary elections in democratic systems to product placement in online shopping platforms. There is a large body…

cs.GT2023

Unravelling Expressive Delegations: Complexity and Normative Analysis

Giannis Tyrovolas, Andrei Constantinescu, Edith Elkind

We consider binary group decision-making under a rich model of liquid democracy recently proposed by Colley, Grandi, and Novaro (2022): agents submit ranked delegation options, whe…