1 citations · 2 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
20 papers
On the LLM Verification for Argument Graph Generation
Jakub Bąba, Jarosław A. Chudziak
Multi-agent LLM systems can formalize natural-language argumentation end-to-end, turning plain text into structured graphs by classifying components, connecting them with relations…
Coopshift: Post-Training Amplifies The Memory Curse In LLM Cooperation
Jiayuan Liu, Shiyi Du, Tianqin Li +3
How does post-training change cooperation during repeated interaction? Within each of seven released model lineages, we compare pretrained (Base), supervised fine-tuned (SFT), and…
What You Earn from What You Learn: Characterization and Complexity of the Value of Information
Ratip Emin Berker, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde +3
We examine the value of information in extensive-form decision problems: the largest multiplicative gain that a decision maker can obtain from an information refinement, taken over…
Do LLMs Take Care of Their Own? Similarity Signals Can Induce Cooperation
Akash Kundu, Emanuel Tewolde, Ratip Emin Berker +2
As LLM-based agents with user-instructed goals are becoming widely deployed, they increasingly encounter each other in strategic interactions, and face challenges of finding mutual…
The Memory Curse: How Expanded Recall Erodes Cooperative Intent in LLM Agents
Jiayuan Liu, Tianqin Li, Shiyi Du +7
Context window expansion is often treated as a straightforward capability upgrade for LLMs, but we find it systematically fails in multi-agent social dilemmas. Across 7 LLMs and 4…
CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas
Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita +2
It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reason…
Decision Making under Imperfect Recall: Algorithms and Benchmarks
Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides +2
In game theory, imperfect-recall decision problems model situations in which an agent forgets information it held before. They encompass games such as the ``absentminded driver'' a…
On the Edge of Core (Non-)Emptiness: An Automated Reasoning Approach to Approval-Based Multi-Winner Voting
Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer +3
Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setti…
Evaluating Generalization Capabilities of LLM-Based Agents in Mixed-Motive Scenarios Using Concordia
Chandler Smith, Marwa Abdulhai, Manfred Diaz +83
Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities for social interaction and are increasingly being deployed in situations where they might engage with bo…
Convergence of Regret Matching in Potential Games and Constrained Optimization
Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang +3
Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games…
The Complexity of Equilibrium Refinements in Potential Games
Ioannis Anagnostides, Maria-Florina Balcan, Kiriaki Fragkia +3
The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games;…
When Ethics and Payoffs Diverge: LLM Agents in Morally Charged Social Dilemmas
Steffen Backmann, David Guzman Piedrahita, Terry Jingchen Zhang +4
Recent advances in LLMs have enabled their use in complex agentic roles, involving decision-making with humans or other agents, making ethical alignment a critical concern. While p…
Expected Variational Inequalities
Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde +4
Variational inequalities (VIs) encompass many fundamental problems in diverse areas ranging from engineering to economics and machine learning. However, their considerable expressi…
Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them
Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld +2
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also…
Learning and Computation of -Equilibria at the Frontier of Tractability
Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde +4
-equilibria -- and the associated notion of -regret -- are a powerful and flexible framework at the heart of online learning and game theory, whereby enriching the set of dev…
The Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games
Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Ioannis Anagnostides +2
Imperfect-recall games, in which players may forget previously acquired information, have found many practical applications, ranging from game abstractions to team games and testin…
Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity
Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld +4
We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well a…
Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback
Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, Jobst Heitzig +9
Foundation models such as GPT-4 are fine-tuned to avoid unsafe or otherwise problematic behavior, such as helping to commit crimes or producing racist text. One approach to fine-tu…
The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games
Emanuel Tewolde, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer +1
We study single-player extensive-form games with imperfect recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem or the Absentminded Driver game. For such games, two natural equilibrium conc…
Game Transformations That Preserve Nash Equilibria or Best-Response Sets
Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer
In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N-player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP…